FreeSWITCH is the software that answers the call. It is an open-source telephony engine, a softswitch, which means it routes voice calls, bridges the SIP trunks that connect a phone system to the outside world, runs voicemail and conference bridges, and sits at the center of a lot of hosted phone platforms and call centers. On November 9 the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency added a FreeSWITCH flaw, CVE-2026-116779, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog and gave federal civilian agencies until November 12 to patch under Binding Operational Directive 26-04. SignalWire, the company that maintains FreeSWITCH, has confirmed the bug is being exploited in the wild.
The short version is ugly. A single SIP MESSAGE, the kind of small instant-message packet that SIP phones use to send text and presence updates, can make the server run a command of the sender's choosing. The CVSS score is 9.8 out of 10, and the attack vector is the worst kind there is: remote, no privileges required, no user interaction.
How one message becomes a command
The mechanism is worth walking through, because it explains why this is not a flaw you can shrug off. SIP MESSAGE is a request method in the Session Initiation Protocol, the signaling language behind most voice-over-IP. It carries a short payload to a recipient address, the same way a chat client sends a line of text to a username. FreeSWITCH handles that incoming request in a function named sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message(). That function takes the recipient part of the address, splits it on a plus sign, and treats the left half as the name of a chat protocol.
One of the chat protocols FreeSWITCH registers, through a default module called mod_dptools, is named "api". When a message is addressed to that protocol, the handler passes the rest of the address straight into switch_api_execute(), the internal function that runs FreeSWITCH API commands. So a sender who can deliver a MESSAGE to a listening profile gets to choose which API command the server executes on their behalf.
That is the whole trick. There is no memory corruption, no cryptographic break, no race condition. The server was simply built to route a text message to an interface that runs commands, and it did exactly that. The reachable commands include ones that read configuration, disclose stored credentials, and take full control of live calls. Through the system command, or through inline Lua when the common mod_lua module is loaded, the same path reaches operating-system command execution running as the FreeSWITCH process.
Put plainly, the recipient field of an unsolicited text message got to decide what code a telephone server ran.
Why a default install is already exposed
The exposure is the part that should worry anyone running a stock build. FreeSWITCH ships with a sample configuration called vanilla, and vanilla leaves chat enabled on both the internal and external SIP profiles. A profile here is just a named set of listening sockets and settings. The external profile is the one that faces the internet on most deployments. Nothing unusual has to be switched on for the flaw to be reachable.
Authentication barely helps. The advisory notes that the stock directory, the file that defines SIP users, includes a sample user with no password and no a1-hash. That user authenticates successfully unless the operator has set allow-empty-password to false. Even where MESSAGE authentication is enforced, the project is explicit that authentication alone does not remove the vulnerability. It raises the bar from "anyone on the internet" to "anyone with a SIP account." In a call center with a few hundred extensions, or a hosting provider with thousands of tenants, that is not much of a bar.
What the patch changes, and what the workarounds don't
The fix landed in FreeSWITCH 1.11.3, and the advisory, tracked as GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p, went public on October 28. The patch adds a new per-profile parameter, enable-chat-api-proto, and ships it turned off. With that default in place, a MESSAGE that tries to select the api protocol now receives a 403 response and gets logged instead of running a command. Everything at version 1.11.2 or earlier is affected.
If you cannot upgrade right away, the workaround that actually closes the path is to set enable-chat=false on every profile that does not need inbound SIP chat. Most phone deployments never use SIP MESSAGE chat at all, so for a lot of operators this costs nothing in lost function. Disabling chat per profile is the main mitigation the project recommends short of patching.
Be careful with the half-measures, because two of the obvious ones do not do what they appear to do. Setting disable_system_api_commands=true removes only the system API command, so an attacker reaches for inline Lua instead and runs code that way. Requiring MESSAGE authentication and deleting the passwordless directory user lowers the risk but leaves the command path open to any sender who holds a valid account. Neither one substitutes for the patch or for turning chat off.
What to check, and what this keeps teaching us
What I would check first, running a FreeSWITCH fleet, is which profiles listen on public addresses and whether chat is enabled on them. Grep the sip_profiles configuration for enable-chat, confirm whether mod_dptools and mod_lua are loaded, and look at the directory for any user missing a password or a1-hash. Those three answers tell you how exposed you are before you touch the binary. If the external profile is on a public interface, chat is on, and the directory still carries the sample accounts, you should treat the host as reachable and move quickly rather than waiting for a maintenance window.
Detection is worth standing up even after you patch, because a server that was internet-facing before November may already have taken a hit. The 403 responses that 1.11.3 now logs are a clean signal that someone is probing the api proto path. Short of that, watch for unexpected outbound connections from the telephony host, new processes spawned by the FreeSWITCH user, and SIP MESSAGE requests whose recipient addresses contain a plus sign followed by something that looks like a command rather than a username. Telephony servers tend to sit in a quiet corner of the network with high trust and little monitoring, which is exactly why an attacker who lands one likes to stay. Credentials for SIP trunks, recordings, and call-detail records all live within reach of that process, and so does a pivot point into the rest of the voice network.
There is a pattern here that keeps repeating in infrastructure software, and it is not really about FreeSWITCH. The dangerous capability was a convenience feature, chat-to-API routing, that was powerful, enabled by default, and reachable by an unauthenticated stranger. That combination is where a lot of the worst remote-code-execution bugs come from. A feature that lets a trusted operator run commands by text is useful. The same feature with no boundary between operator and stranger is a remote shell with extra steps.
The KEV listing is the part that sets the clock. CISA adds entries because a flaw is being used, not because it might be, and the agency has not named the attackers or said how many organizations have been hit. For anyone running FreeSWITCH, the order of operations is simple: patch to 1.11.3, or set enable-chat=false on exposed profiles today, pull any passwordless accounts out of the directory, and start logging the api-proto rejections so you can tell whether someone got there first.
References
SignalWire. (2026, October 28). FreeSWITCH SIP MESSAGE command execution via chat api proto (GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p). GitHub Security Advisories. https://github.com/signalwire/freeswitch/security/advisories/GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p
eSecurity Planet Staff. (2026, November 10). CISA adds four exploited flaws to KEV, sets Nov. 12 patch deadline. eSecurity Planet. https://www.esecurityplanet.com/vulnerabilities/news-cisa-kev-gpustack-freeswitch-openssh-ibm-november-2026/
Rescana. (2026, October 29). FreeSWITCH CVE-2026-116779: Critical SIP MESSAGE flaw exploited in the wild, fixed in 1.11.3. Rescana CVE Analysis Center. https://www.rescana.com/post/freeswitch-cve-2026-116779-sip-message-rce-prepare-now